① The People’s Livelihood Recovery Consumption Coupons were incorporated into the 2025 supplementary budget to stimulate household consumption and boost sales for small business owners, with KRW 13.522 trillion distributed to all citizens. In practice, around 70% of the coupons were issued through credit cards, while the remainder were provided in the form of Local Love Gift Certificates and prepaid cards. To evaluate the economic effects of the coupons, this paper analyzes their direct effects in terms of sales growth at eligible merchants and the stimulation of household consumption. First, we examine the sales-boosting effect using large-sclae credit card sales data from six card companies*(Local Love Gift Certificates and prepaid cards are excluded from the analysis). In addition, we assess the consumption-stimulating effect based on two-waveAugust 13-20, 2025(1st) and October 27-November 7, 2025(2nd) self-reported surveys**.
* Monthly business-level panel data on credit card salessix card companies(KB, BC, NH, Shinhan, Samsung, Hyundai), covering 78%, from January 2022 to January 2026
** Panel survey of the same respondents who actually applied for the Consumption coupons1st: 1,536, 2nd: 1,010(Including round 1 respondents)
② First, the analysis of the sales-boosting effect showed that average monthly sales per eligible merchant increased by about 2.91% more than those of ineligible merchants. Additional estimates using various methodologies* range from 1.46% to 3.76%. For both the first- and second-round provision, the policy effects of the coupons were concentrated in the early phase and lasted only for a short period. These findings confirm that the provision of Consumption Coupons is well suited as a short-term remedy when stabilizing the people’s livelihood economy is urgently needed.
* Counterfactual changes in sales at eligible merchants in the absence of the Consumption Coupons were specified from multiple perspectives.
③ The effects were larger in non-capital regions in both the first round, which introduced regionally differentiated supportNon-metropolitan regions: +KRW 30,000; rural depopulation areas: +KRW 50,000, and the second round, which did not. In particular, the overall effect was largest in non-metropolitan(one of non-capital areas) regions*, suggesting that the Consumption Coupons policy may induce greater sales-boosting in regions with relatively limited capacity to generate consumption. By industry, the effects were largest for general merchandise storesIncluding food and clothing, followed by restaurants and leisure goods stores, confirming the effects in industries closely related to everyday life.
* It should be noted that, since this study analyzes credit card sales, the sales-boosting effect may be underestimated in rural depopulation areas, where a relatively large share of the Consumption Coupons was issued through non-credit-card payment methods.
④ Based on these results, the additional sales-boosting effect at eligible merchants, aggregated nationwide,* was estimated at approximately KRW 2.8 trillion. This means that about 30.9% of fiscal outlays translated into additional sales growth at eligible merchants. Applying various methodologies, the sales-boosting effect was estimated to range from KRW 1.4 trillion to KRW 3.6 trillion, while the effect relative to fiscal outlays ranged from 16.1% to 39.8%.
* Effect based on KRW 9.1 trillion issued through credit cards out of the total KRW 13.5 trillion in Consumption Coupons.
⑤ Next, the survey-based analysis of the consumption-stimulating effect showed that the marginal propensity to consume(MPC)* out of the Consumption Coupons was estimated at 0.20. By income level, the MPC tended to be higher among lower-income groups, suggesting that the consumption-stimulating effect can be amplified if support targets are set more precisely and differentiated support is provided in parallel. By consumption item, the effect of inducing new consumption was large for durable goods, semi-durable goods, and leisure, while small for items with the characteristics of essential goods, such as non-durable goods, education, and medical services.
* The share of total coupon spending attributable to newley-induced consumption by the coupons.
⑥ Turning to the difference between the first and second round provision, MPC for the first-round(0.21) was slightly higher than that for the second-round(0.18). This is because the MPC for the second-round was lower than that for the first-provision across most income quintiles, including among low-income groups. Although the survey questions alone do not allow for a rigorous identification of the underlying
cause, one possible explanation is that the smaller per-capita payment in the second round (KRW 100,000), compared with the first round (KRW 150,000–550,000), may have weakened the policy’s salience, or the extent to which recipients perceived the support.
⑦ Taken together, these results suggest that the People’s Livelihood Recovery Consumption Coupons increased economic growthGDP in 2025 by an estimated 0.12%. Applying various methodologies yields estimates ranging from 0.07% to 0.15%. These findings indicate that the policy transmission channel operated effectively: the increase in households’ disposable income generated by the Consumption Coupons translated into actual consumption and higher sales at eligible merchants, thereby raising economic growth.
⑧ When implementing policies similar to the Consumption Coupons in the future, their economic effects could be enhanced by carefully designing the policy timing, differentiated support scheme, and scope of eligible merchants. In addition, policy efforts will be needed to structurally improve the competitiveness and productivity of the self-employed and small business owners.