Despite prolonged geopolitical tensions, including the U.S.–China rivalry and the Russia–Ukraine war, global trade has remained relatively stable, rather than fragmenting into full-scale rival blocs as seen during the Cold War(1947–90).

Using UN General Assembly voting data, we measure how countries' relative proximity to the United States and China has shifted since 2017 along two dimensions: geopolitical(political and security) and geoeconomic(economic and development). The results reveal a decoupling between the two: while most countries have moved closer to the United States geopolitically, their geoeconomic alignment has shifted in varying directions across countries and regions. This suggests that, amid heightened geopolitical tensions, geoeconomic alignment does not move in tandem with geopolitical alignment, but is instead shaped by differences in countries' industrial structures, external economic relations, and positions in global supply chains.

To understand why global economic linkages have remained resilient despite geopolitical tensions, attention should turn to the role of “connector countries.” These economies are closely integrated with both the U.S. market and China-centered production networks and have helped sustain global economic linkages through third-country production and sourcing even as direct U.S.–China trade declines. Vietnam, India, and Mexico are representative examples. Analysis based on UN General Assembly voting shows that these countries have moved closer to the United States geopolitically, while maintaining geoeconomic positions closer to China or shifting further toward it. This pattern offers one clue to how they have sustained economic ties with both sides and, in doing so, supported global economic linkages.

Similar shifts are evident in Korea's supply chains. Korea has become more closely linked to final demand in both the United States and China through production networks in connector countries such as Vietnam. Analysis using the OECD Inter-Country Input-Output(ICIO) tables for 2016–22 shows that, of the Korean value added embodied in exports to Vietnam, the share ultimately absorbed by U.S. final demand(including consumption and investment) rose from 11.1% in 2016 to 18.5% in 2022, while the share absorbed by Chinese final demand increased from 7.3% to 13.9%. The increases were particularly pronounced in computer, electronic and optical products, including semiconductors, where the shares rose from 12.8% to 21.0% for the United States and from 11.2% to 19.4% for China. Vietnam's production networks have thus become an increasingly important channel linking Korean value added to final demand in both markets.

The channels through which Korean value added reaches U.S. final demand have also shifted. Analysis shows that the share reaching U.S. final demand directly from Korea remained broadly stable (73.1% to 72.4%). By contrast, among indirect pathways through third-country production bases, the share via China fell from 10.7% to 6.8%, while the share via the ASEAN-5, including Vietnam, rose from 4.9% to 8.3%. The shift is even more pronounced in computer, electronic and optical products, including semiconductors: the ASEAN-5 share rose steadily and reached 18.6% by 2022, surpassing China’s 17.0%. In short, while direct linkages between Korea and the United States have remained largely intact, ASEAN production networks have taken on a growing role in indirect linkages—a change most visible in Korea’s key industries.

Taken together, these findings suggest that, despite recent geopolitical fragmentation, economic linkages across countries are being sustained through a reorganization of existing global supply chain pathways rather than severed. Korea, too, has maintained its connections with both the United States and China by leveraging established production networks in ASEAN, rather than sharply reducing ties with either side. By widening the range of production and export options available in the event of a geopolitical shock, this network structure may strengthen the resilience of Korea's supply chains.

However, these developments also entail new forms of risk. As a larger share of Korean value added reaching the United States now passes through ASEAN, tighter U.S. supply chain regulations—such as rules of origin or anti-circumvention investigations—could indirectly affect Korean firms and demand for Korean intermediate inputs through production activities in ASEAN. Policy should therefore seek to leverage the buffering role of connector countries while managing the risk that policy shifts in major economies or supply chain disruptions are transmitted back to Korea through third-country production networks. Diversifying supply chains to reduce dependence on particular production bases or routes is also needed.